Books like "The Invention of Europe," "Thinking Europe," "The European Miracle," and "The Formation of the West" are built on the idea of European exceptionalism. We have to acknowledge that they have been incredibly successful. These and similar books were taken seriously in Türkiye for a long time, shaping unshakable beliefs about Europe and the West in the minds of their readers. The authors based their work on common assumptions about Europe, and the resulting ideas spread easily worldwide. However, as recently articulated, local histories were turned into global designs, constructing a Eurocentric world. Yes, Europe was first invented, then the scope of this invention expanded and globalized. While we say these ideas spread easily worldwide, we must also acknowledge that this was a highly complex process. The success lay in mastering this complexity. The result was striking: viewing events from imperial centers became a habit. Most people began to see even their own reality through this lens, making it hard to discern who was speaking.
The spread of ideas discussed in the books mentioned earlier was impressively wide, making it difficult to build critiques of the global design that emerged. However, once it becomes clear that this global design is rooted in the West's political and intellectual culture and is driven by a scientific and political will to dominate the non-European and "colored" peoples of the Third World, responding to it is no longer a matter of choice. Books built on the idea of European exceptionalism are part of this imperial nature. Therefore, it's essential to move away from the student mindset towards European and Western ideas and instead turn these ideas into objects of study. This is no easy task, but the real challenge will be resolved by uncovering the imperial nature of these ideas.
Developments show that the issue isn't limited to "outside Europe." When discussing nationalisms within Europe, questions about which countries have submitted and continue to exist in a state of dependency inevitably arise. In this context, are we witnessing the mobilization of internal nationalisms with the European Parliament elections, or are we noticing the peripheries within Europe? Undoubtedly, the unexpected resistance in Gaza and Ukraine has highlighted movements within Europe. We must also state that each region should be considered separately. The different stances within "Europe" on developments in Gaza and Ukraine prove that each region must be individually analyzed. The Germans' eagerness to align with the Anglo-Saxons is also a unique situation.
Today, particularly after Gaza and Ukraine, we can say that the unifying nature of the West's and Europe's imperial nature has diminished. There have always been peripheries within Europe, but the idea of Europe played a unifying role, and different nationalisms ignored losses because they were manageable. As the unifying nature of the imperial character begins to erode, opening the door to different nationalisms is a natural outcome. This situation could pave the way for a new era of peaceful competition, as in the past, but the extensive areas encompassed by the imperial nature make this nearly impossible. When Europe was invented, there was only Europe, but now there are also Europes outside of Europe. This causes differentiation in the Anglo-Saxon world.
We can anticipate that the project of provincializing Europe will become more prominent. All developments indicate that the era of considering Europe a "miracle," the "end of history," and a "global design despite being a local history" is over. This will be discussed more, especially "within Europe," because the main problem for "Europe" is the emergence of boundaries. This also indicates the new natural borders of imperial centers.
