There is now a state in Syria

Following the downfall of Syria’s brutal, bloody, and oppressive 61-year regime at the hands of its people, the roadmap for the newly established state is gradually emerging—at its own natural pace.

Meanwhile, some observers, both locally and from Europe, have already begun offering unsolicited advice from the comfort of their own idealized realities, without considering the depths of darkness and hell the country has just escaped. When Ahmed al-Sharaa suggested that free and fair elections would naturally require at least three to four years, some nearly resorted to invoking the spirit of Assad for reassurance. What were they expecting? Elections tomorrow? With what population registry? Under what system? Are they even aware of what they’re saying? It’s all just empty rhetoric.

Of course, these reactions are not even worth taking seriously. But unfortunately, we are all too familiar with this mindset—one that begrudges the Syrian people even the joy of liberation after suffering under a regime that subjected millions to hell for over six decades.

Thankfully, those who have assumed responsibility for Syria’s transition are highly capable, intelligent, and level-headed individuals. They know exactly what they are doing and what needs to be done. What everyone must recognize, above all else, is that these people, who have freed Syria from a 61-year rule of thuggery, deserve immense respect and appreciation. Yet despite this, the new leadership exhibits neither arrogance nor vengeful triumphalism. There is no reckless euphoria in their victory. Their adherence to Islamic ethics and principles keeps them firmly within the bounds of justice and morality, and as long as they remain committed to these values, they continue to set exemplary standards.

A striking example of this came just recently when Ahmed al-Sharaa, newly declared interim president of Syria, rejected the idea of his image being displayed in public squares or government offices as a revolutionary icon. This decision stands in stark contrast to the idolization seen in modern power structures worldwide. Even after the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini did not object to the widespread display of his images in the same manner. This is worth noting. Sharaa and his administration’s stance suggests a commitment to a more inclusive, consultative governance model that values and respects others.

Just last week, a National Conference Preparatory Committee was established to oversee the drafting of a new Syrian constitution and to consult on the country’s overall direction. The committee’s spokesperson, Hasan Dugheim, shared promising insights following the first meetings:

He outlined the committee’s missions and principles as follows:

Managing and enhancing communication among Syrians.
Facilitating discussions, committee work, and idea exchanges.
Structuring, analyzing, and summarizing debates based on majority views.
Maintaining neutrality by providing a well-organized, productive dialogue environment.
Ensuring transparency—there are no secret agendas or closed-door sessions.
Keeping all preparatory work, visits, and initiatives open for public discussion.

The location of the committee’s first meeting was also significant—it took place in Idlib, a city that served as the cradle of the Syrian revolution. The session prioritized the reconstruction process and the return of displaced citizens, an issue of vital importance for heavily devastated regions like central and southern Idlib, eastern Aleppo, Homs, Eastern Ghouta, Darayya, and Jobar. Thousands of people still struggle to survive in tents, deprived of basic necessities, making the return process the most pressing concern.

At the same time, the committee voiced strong criticism of international organizations, including the United Nations, for their failure to facilitate genuine progress in Syria. It was noted that their efforts have been little more than rhetoric, fruitless meetings, and symbolic displays of power. While lessons can be drawn from their involvement, relying on these organizations is unrealistic. However, the National Conference remains committed to transparency and will not impose any restrictions on engagement with international actors.

At Al Jazeera’s recent conference in Doha—"From the Gaza War to Syria’s Transformation: Changing Dynamics in the Middle East"—a sudden wave of concern arose over potential legal violations against Alawites. A particularly moving testimony came from an elderly Syrian man who had endured 30 years of injustice and torture in Saydnaya and Tadmur prisons. His words painted a harrowing picture of the horrors inflicted by the Assad regime. At the end of his speech, he emphasized a critical truth: Assad’s policies were deeply sectarian, and he personally witnessed how sectarian hatred fueled acts of torture. The perpetrators not only inflicted suffering but did so with open expressions of sectarian vengeance.

Yet despite all this, he insisted that these experiences must never justify a campaign of revenge against Alawites as a sect.

This statement is crucial. Today, the same voices that spent 54 years defending sectarian hatred and oppression now feign concern over sectarian injustices. But the true guarantee against sectarian revenge is not their sudden newfound sensitivities—it is the revolutionary leadership’s deep-rooted faith and moral principles.

Does this mean there will be no legal accountability for those who directly participated in the regime’s massacres and crimes against humanity? Of course not. Could it ever be conceivable that such crimes go unpunished? But this accountability is not targeted at any particular sect. The Assad regime had Sunni officials who actively facilitated its systematic crimes, and they too will not be exempt from justice simply because they are Sunni.

Legal proceedings are being conducted strictly within the framework of law, ensuring that justice does not devolve into random acts of vengeance. The process is now an official state-led legal prosecution rather than a chaotic pursuit of retribution.

Moreover, the Alawite community itself suffered tremendously under the Assad regime. Assad used them as pawns to maintain his grip on power but never truly shared authority with them. He pushed them to the forefront of his worst crimes, yet offered them no future, no prosperity—only suffering and exploitation. Like the rest of Syria, Alawites also bore the brunt of the misery and deprivation inflicted by Assad’s rule.

After all, Assad’s regime never operated like a state—it functioned as a mafia-like criminal enterprise. This was evident in its drug production networks, which became a massive crisis for the entire world, particularly the Gulf countries. The regime, rather than governing in the interests of its people, degraded itself into nothing more than an organized crime syndicate.

Now, Syria stands at the threshold of a new era. And for the first time in 61 years, its people are shaping their own future—at their own pace, on their own terms.