Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood...

One of the most significant developments in the Middle East last week was the decision by the Kingdom of Jordan to officially declare the Muslim Brotherhood organization (commonly known as the Ikhwan) illegal and seize all of its assets.

This move is particularly striking given that the Brotherhood had, until recently, been able to operate with relative freedom in Jordan. To understand the full context, it's worth revisiting some history.

Founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna and his associates in the Egyptian city of Ismailia, the Muslim Brotherhood quickly expanded to neighboring countries. Jordan, with its sizeable Palestinian population, officially recognized the organization in 1945. King Abdullah himself attended the opening ceremony of the Brotherhood's Amman branch, seeing the group's social welfare efforts as politically useful for expanding grassroots support in a country with its own unique set of internal challenges.

Over the years, the relationship between the Jordanian monarchy and the Brotherhood evolved into a kind of pragmatic cooperation, particularly amid the region’s persistent turmoil. After King Abdullah was assassinated inside Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque by a Palestinian gunman on July 20, 1951, the Brotherhood took a clear stance against violence. During the 47-year reign of King Hussein—who ascended to the throne in 1952 at just 17—the Brotherhood consistently supported the monarchy in times of political and economic crisis.

When a group of military officers, inspired by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, attempted a coup on April 13, 1957, the Brotherhood firmly sided with King Hussein. Their opposition to Nasser's regime—which had harshly repressed the Brotherhood in Egypt—played a significant role in shaping this stance. Again in the fall of 1970, during what came to be known as "Black September," the Brotherhood aligned itself with the monarchy as Palestinian factions were violently expelled from Jordan. These two crises—1957 and 1970—resulted in the removal of all Palestinian resistance groups from Jordanian territory.

Another episode that reinforced the Brotherhood’s alliance with the monarchy occurred during the nationwide protests that shook Jordan from April 18 to May 30, 1989. As widespread economic hardship brought angry crowds to the streets demanding reform, the Brotherhood once again declared its loyalty to King Hussein—a stance it repeated during renewed unrest in August and September of 1996.

During this period, the Jordanian Brotherhood underwent a structural transformation. In 1992, it formally established the "Islamic Action Front" (IAF) as its political arm. Operating within Jordan’s monarchical system, the IAF became a legitimate channel for Islamists to express their views—particularly in a country where the king holds sweeping powers, including the authority to dissolve parliament.

However, the Brotherhood’s relationship with the regime began to deteriorate under King Abdullah II, who succeeded his father in 1999. Although he initially welcomed some Brotherhood members into the cabinet, the king gradually distanced the group from state institutions. This shift was driven by both regional dynamics and international pressure—especially from the United States. The Arab Spring only deepened the rift. A 2016 police raid on the Brotherhood’s headquarters in Amman marked a turning point.

Finally, on April 23, Jordan’s Interior Minister Mazin al-Faraya announced that the Muslim Brotherhood was now officially illegal, all of its offices and institutions would be shut down, and its assets and bank accounts seized.

This decision was heavily influenced by pressure from powerful regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt—all of which already classify the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Given Jordan’s reliance on foreign economic aid, defying these pressures would have been extremely difficult.

With this move, the Brotherhood has lost a critical foothold in the region. Yet Jordan’s unique position in the Middle East suggests that the regime may, at some point in the future, once again find it politically expedient to engage with the Brotherhood—if only to preserve its own legitimacy.