The Dam and Beyond: Ethiopia’s GERD Reshapes Nile Politics

Ethiopia officially inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) last Tuesday, a massive $5 billion project built on the Blue Nile, one of the river’s two main tributaries. Construction began in 2011, and GERD now stands as one of Africa’s largest hydroelectric plants—the first of many mega-projects Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government plans to pursue. At the opening ceremony, Abiy declared: “With the completion of this dam, a new chapter has begun in our nation’s history. Next comes a nuclear power plant, to be used solely for peaceful purposes. The dam will bring us tremendous wealth. The era of begging is over.” He also announced plans for a new airport in Addis Ababa with a 60 million-passenger annual capacity and signaled further oil and gas exploration.

Across the region, GERD was hailed as a milestone. Kenya’s President William Ruto called it “proof that Africa’s peoples can shape their own destiny.” South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir described the dam as “a symbol of unity, dedication, and determination,” while Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh called it “a day of great victory.”

But behind the upbeat statements from political leaders, GERD’s operation has angered two countries directly affected: Egypt and Sudan. In a joint statement last week, Cairo and Khartoum condemned Ethiopia’s “unilateral actions,” warning that the dam poses “a threat to regional peace and stability.”

Khartoum—at the confluence of the White Nile and Blue Nile—is currently mired in war and unable to pressure Ethiopia. Egypt, however, is using every tool at its disposal to push back against what it sees as an existential threat. With 90 percent of its population directly dependent on the Nile for water, Cairo views GERD as a “matter of life and death.”

Under a 1929 colonial-era treaty brokered while Britain dominated East Africa, Egypt was allocated the lion’s share of Nile waters. After King Farouk’s overthrow, President Gamal Abdel Nasser cemented Egypt’s control with the Aswan High Dam and fought to preserve its privileged position for decades. In the 1970s, President Anwar Sadat even warned Nile Basin countries that violating the 1929 agreement could be considered “an act of war.”

But the balance of power in Africa has shifted. Britain has long withdrawn, China has become a major player in infrastructure, and Ethiopia has strengthened ties with Israel, giving it new global connections. Israel is now effectively aligned against Egypt on GERD, having played a key role in financing and securing the dam.

While Egypt tries to keep its relations with Israel stable under the 1979 Camp David Accords, Israel shows little sense of obligation in return—constraining Egypt in Gaza and undermining it in the Nile Basin. Cairo’s reliance on colonial-era agreements to justify its Nile dominance is increasingly untenable. Israel, well aware of this, continues to exploit Egypt’s vulnerabilities.

Aligning with Israel has brought Egypt no real gains—only setbacks. GERD, in that sense, is a warning: Egypt must rethink its strategy before it is too late. Decision-makers in Cairo should read this message clearly and act accordingly—something many in the Muslim world are now urging.