Iran is stepping on Türkiye's toes, not Israel's

Israel is striking all of Iran’s regional interests, leaving Tehran on shaky ground. Yet, Iran isn’t retaliating, as its strategy doesn’t involve direct confrontation with Israel. However, it’s becoming increasingly difficult for Iran to maintain its presence in the region. So, what will Tehran do? Interestingly, Iran is taking steps to limit Türkiye’s influence. How, you ask? Let me explain.

Israel’s Clear Objective

Israel views the current geopolitical situation as an opportunity. Its goal was to annex Gaza. That hasn’t worked out, but to cement its occupation, Israel is stalling peace talks. As I’ve mentioned before, Israel also aims to establish a buffer zone in southern Lebanon and Syria.

An attack on Lebanon is imminent. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said, “We are shifting our forces and resources to the north.” The long-standing strikes on Lebanon have now escalated, with Israel conducting a highly sophisticated intelligence operation. Explosive devices were planted in pagers and radios that Hezbollah had purchased a few months earlier—likely from a Mossad front company—and these were detonated simultaneously.

The MIT-Mossad Difference

These attacks aim to cripple Hezbollah before a possible ground operation. This is a low-cost strategy. Hezbollah paid for the devices, but they’ve now incapacitated hundreds of its members. While one aspect of the operation is about weakening Hezbollah, the other is Israel’s disregard for the distinction between military and civilian targets. Devices that civilians use were also weaponized, making this operation an act of terrorism.

Let’s take a moment to highlight the difference in approach. Though this type of operation might appear sophisticated from the outside, it’s actually a common method used by intelligence agencies. What makes this Mossad operation stand out is that it targeted not just specific individuals but a large group indiscriminately, including civilians. Mossad has caused civilian deaths, committing a crime in the process. It has done this to restore its reputation after the massive intelligence failure of October 7.

In contrast, MIT (Türkiye’s intelligence agency) is also proficient in such operations but, unlike Mossad, it clearly distinguishes between military and civilian targets. For example, the terrorist PKK ringleaders have banned its members from using certain products that are well-suited to rough terrain. Why? Because numerous terrorists have become incapacitated after using these products. This distinction is crucial.

Iran’s Priority: The Nuclear Program

One of Israel’s goals is to provoke Iran into responding so it can justify an attack on Tehran’s nuclear facilities. In this context, Israel has targeted Iranian elements in Lebanon and Syria, bombed the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killed senior Iranian commanders, and even attempted to assassinate Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. And now, we’ve seen the pager attacks. As I’ve written before, Iran is unlikely to act until it achieves its nuclear goals. (We’ll see if the pager attacks change that stance.)

Apart from its nuclear ambitions, other developments are also pushing Iran to retreat in the region. First, Tehran is uncomfortable with the Assad regime’s push to be reintegrated into the Arab League under Saudi leadership. Second, Iran is uneasy about Türkiye’s growing cooperation with Iraq (on issues like counterterrorism and the Development Road project). Third, Iran is adopting a more aggressive stance in response to losing influence in the South Caucasus following the Nagorno-Karabakh victory and the ongoing debate over the Zangezur Corridor. But where is all this leading?

Signs of Escalation

I’ve already written about the growing signs of tension between Iran and Türkiye (see my article "Difficult Topics with Iran," January 2024). Now, new developments affecting Türkiye are coming to light.

First, there have been surprising shifts in the Türkiye-Syria dialogue process. At the Arab League summit in Cairo, Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad left the room when Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan took the stage. This was a stark contrast to the general trend. The next day, Mekdad introduced a new condition for dialogue, saying Türkiye must withdraw its troops from Syria and Iraq for a full normalization—despite Assad’s earlier backtracking on the troop withdrawal condition. The emphasis on Iraq here is new and significant. This is not Damascus’s demand but Tehran’s.

Talabani’s Selfie: A Message to Türkiye?

Second, Iran made its move in Iraq during the Kirkuk governorate elections. A Turkish drone was shot down in Kirkuk shortly after. Baghdad responded by saying, “We’re not sure how it happened.” Meanwhile, Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, made his first foreign visit to Iraq. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Bafel Talabani posted a friendly selfie with Pezeshkian. Talabani’s ties with PKK terrorists and even the U.S. have been well-documented, making this photo a message directed at Türkiye.

Third, the Zangezur Corridor is strategically vital for Türkiye’s land connection with the Turkic world. Tehran opposes the project and recently declared it a “red line.” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said any changes to the borders of neighboring countries would be a red line for Iran.

In summary, Israel is putting pressure on Iran, and in response, Iran is adopting more aggressive policies in its immediate surroundings. This is undoubtedly stepping on Türkiye’s toes.