A country that was traditionally viewed as the torchbearer of the Global South and a main contributor to the formation of multilateral groupings, including BRICS, is now in the murky diplomatic waters of its own doing. It has always been interpreted as a counterweight to such Western hegemony as that of the United States when it comes to being part of BRICS, an economic and political alliance between Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Nevertheless, with India becoming progressively close to Washington, there is an escalating concern of its place in BRICS. In a sensitive but informal diplomatic juggling that the capital is attempting, it is straining to be part of the bloc and at the same time seeking the favor of the very Western powers that BRICS was envisaged to counter. This hypocrisy is weakening the foreign policy of India as it appears to leave some dark clouds over its relations in BRICS and failing to bind the group to a unified entity.
The rising military, economic and diplomatic ties between India and the United States raise doubts on how far India is committed on anti- Western rhetoric of BRICS in the long run. Though other BRICS countries; particularly Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa are on the same platform castigating U.S unilateralism, India has been playing another game. Even though India publicly identifies its motives as strategic autonomy, it has readily accommodated itself with Washington, specifically, by joining the Quad, a security group consisting of the U.S., along with Japan and Australia. The shift of India towards the U.S can be seen in the fact that in spite of the attempt by BRICS to establish an alternative financial order, which will act as a challenge to the dominance of the West, India has been supportive to the global supremacy of the dollar. In this regard, the failure of India to ratify the demands of BRICS to de-dollarize has attracted the resentment of its fellow members of the association which begs the question as to where India stands.
The paradoxes of the foreign policy of India can be recapitulated by the argument delivered by Alex Travelli in his publication titled One of These BRICS Is Not Like the others, posted in the New York Times. Travelli outlines the fact that the growing drift towards the West, towards the U.S. to be more specific, makes India stand distinct among the remaining BRICS members, jeopardizing the ideological cohesion of the bloc. As Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa continue emerging as one force in resistance to the western policies, there seems to be a drift in the diplomatic course that India is taking in relation to the common goals of the named state. Such a change is especially apparent in its approach to financial issues in the global community where India was ardently defending U.S. economic policies against the wishes of BRICS of making the global financial system more inclusive and diverse.
The economic alignment of India does not go beyond the geopolitical hedging. Its membership in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and being a member of two competing multilateral groupings BRICS and U.S.-led Quad has given rise to fear of lack of integrity in its diplomatic activity. The fact that India has managed to balance its interests between the West and the East has given it a tag of being a so called Trojan Horse in the BRICS. The term, which was introduced by Brazilian economist Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., who also served as a former vice president of BRICS Bank shows the view that the hypocrisy of India is straining the solidity of the grouping. This strategic positioning exercised by India, retaining its BRICS membership at a time when it is strengthening its ties with the U.S. can be discussed as another example of a more significant policy ambiguity that is likely to undermine the cohesion of the bloc.
The external setting is another factor that makes India foreign policy difficult. The moves of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to court the U.S. more especially amidst breaches in tariffs triggers by the Trump era, elicite criticism back home in India. The chief opposition party in India, the Congress Party, has criticized the Modi regime as selling the leadership of the BRICS and the sovereignty to the western nations at the cost of the gratification of the west. This mounting internal dissatisfaction is an indication that the diplomatic zigzag that India has taken is not only a point of tension on the international scale but it is also a subject of controversy on the national front. Critics opine that the practice of Modi to seek friendship with the U.S. is weakening Indian leadership of Global South and wears out its adherence to Global principles of multilateralism.
The shift in Indian policy also indicates transactional determinism in international relations in which trade commerce, market entry, and international competitiveness are preferred over ideological commitment to the BRICS bloc. Instead of being the advocate of Global South solidarity, India seems to worry more about good trade conditions and reducing the effects of U.S. tariffs. Such pragmatic yet opportunistic approach is symptomatic of India wishing to get short-term economic gains, however, there is a risk that it could lose those BRICS partners, and they regard those moves as self-serving ones. The fact that India is giving more credence to its national economic interest at the expense of bloc strength means that it is in effect relegating the wider perspective of BRICS as the South-South cooperation framework.
The geo political consequences of what India is doing would be huge. Its involvement in both anti-China organisations such as the Quad and pro-China organisations such as the SCO has created a feeling of policy hypocrisy on the part of India. Such actions in hedging bring about ambiguity and India has a question mark now to what lurks in their true motivations and this dilutes the role of the BRICS as a single force against an overwhelming Western influence. Although India policymakers justify their foreign policy to be an intelligent response to a complicated international environment, the fact is that this ambiguity is likely to divide the BRICS coalition and restrain its capabilities as a global power broker.
India is trying to butter its bread on both sides by being a member of the BRICS and Quad groups because that is the way it can gain the economic power of the BRICS group and the security and diplomatic benefits of the Quad led by the U.S. Though it might help India to achieve its short-term goals, such a strategy can put a black mark on its reputation as an advocate of multilateralism and international equality. Contradictory behavior of India may become the defining moment whether the bloc can preserve its significance in the more divided world order.
To sum up, the Indian diplomatic duality that foreign policy of this country is based on (striking a balance between its relationships with the U.S. on the one hand and BRICS on the other hand) reveals some stark hypocrisies in the Indian foreign policy. Although such a juggling can be beneficial in short-run time, it has the potential of compromising the integrity of BRICS and the leadership role of India among Global South countries. Finding answers to this, as India still tries to navigate and balance between these conflicting allegiances, is whether India can afford to maintain this delicate balancing act and not irritate its BRICS counterparts, or jeopardise its long term interests? The response can turn out to be the major determinant of the contribution of India towards future of international geopolitics.
The writer is Islamabad based expert of strategic affairs and can be reached at asadmalik2008@gmail.com
