The evolving Turkey-Libya partnership anchored by the 2019 maritime agreement offers a rare opportunity for regional cooperation and economic growth
The head of Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), İbrahim Kalın, held a surprise meeting [1] with Khalifa Haftar, leader of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), in Benghazi. This marked the first high-level contact between Ankara and eastern Libya in years, underscoring Türkiye’s intention to maintain channels of communication with all major Libyan actors.
Kalın’s visit is part of a broader Türkiye-Libya diplomatic and security framework. His visit aims to promote Libyan unity and reinforce the Turkish-Libyan memorandum on the Eastern Mediterranean. The visit followed [2] the Istanbul summit among Türkiye, Italy, and Libya on August 1. The three countries are aligning on energy, migration, and regional influence, and have already signaled shared priorities. In their joint declaration, they expressed strong support for a UN-facilitated, Libyan-owned political process to safeguard Libya’s unity, security, and sovereignty.
The 2019 [3] maritime delimitation agreement between Türkiye and Libya represents a pivotal moment in the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean. Signed between Türkiye and Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), the agreement delineates Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) between the two countries, granting them significant sovereign rights over potentially hydrocarbon-rich maritime areas. The strategic and economic implications of this agreement extend well beyond bilateral interests, reshaping regional dynamics and energy politics.
Recent developments have added a new dimension to the agreement's significance. In a notable shift, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR), which initially opposed the deal, has announced the formation of a technical committee [4] to re-examine the 2019 maritime agreement. Media reports suggest that the HoR is now considering ratifying the accord, a move widely interpreted as part of a broader thaw in relations between Ankara and the eastern Libyan administration. If ratified, this would mark a significant turning point by providing unified Libyan support for the agreement, thereby enhancing its political weight and improving its implementation prospects.
The approval of the agreement by the HoR would not be merely symbolic. A unified stance among Libya’s rival factions in support of the deal could encourage Türkiye to begin seismic surveys and drilling operations without necessarily triggering a domestic crisis in Libya.
-Energy cooperation as a driver
Such a move could potentially prompt Cairo to pursue a similar arrangement with Türkiye, potentially extending Egypt’s exclusive economic zone through an agreement with Ankara. Recently, for instance, Libya’s National Oil Company (NOC) signed [5] a memorandum of understanding with the Turkish state oil company TPAO to conduct a geological and geophysical study of four offshore areas.
This approach suggests a pragmatic engagement that could unlock significant economic potential in the Mediterranean’s hydrocarbon resources, transforming the maritime boundary agreement from a political document into a substantive framework for joint energy development and economic cooperation.
Although there has been close cooperation between Ankara and Tripoli governments, Türkiye has in parallel been pursuing reconciliation with the eastern factions. Turkish President Erdogan’s meetings with Aguila Saleh, the Tobruk-based parliament speaker in August 2022 [6] and December 2023 [7], signify Türkiye’s willingness to engage with the country's eastern region. This move indicates that Ankara is no longer viewed with hostility by the Eastern part of the country, but rather as a potential partner, particularly in areas such as completing unfinished construction projects in Benghazi and contributing to the country’s reconstruction. Therefore, the potential ratification of the 2019 agreement reflects ongoing efforts by both sides to strengthen their relationship and enhance cooperation.
After over a decade of conflict, Libya remains deeply divided and lacks strong national institutions and democratic experience, leading to a power vacuum that has allowed various armed groups to assert control over different parts of the country. Therefore, many challenges still lie ahead on the road to stability [8] in Libya. The absence of a constitution remains at the core of Libya’s problems concerning elections. Additionally, there is a lack of security, and the country’s state institutions remain fragile and deeply divided. The early mistake was prioritizing elections without first building the foundations of a functioning state.
-Reconciliation and institution-building
Therefore, Libya requires a comprehensive process of reconciliation and institutional rebuilding. Türkiye’s stated objective is to support the restoration of state institutions and to facilitate a national dialogue aimed at reaching consensus, breaking the political deadlock, and encouraging both sides to hold the long-awaited elections.
Türkiye has positioned itself as a stabilizing actor [9] in Libya, backing the Tripoli-based government while seeking to transform allied militias into a unified army under the 2019 Military Training and Cooperation Agreement. Its support has focused on restructuring the chain of command, developing air defense, training special units, and strengthening naval capacity to address one of Libya’s most urgent post-2011 challenges. Since 2022, Ankara has also engaged with eastern factions, yet without security sector reform and the unification of armed groups, prospects for a political settlement and credible elections remain limited.
While Kalın’s visit to Benghazi underscored Türkiye’s ambition to embed itself in Libya through institution-building, reconciliation, and security-sector reform, realpolitik motivations should not be overlooked. For Ankara, outreach to both Tripoli and Benghazi aligns with a long-term strategy of legitimizing the 2019 maritime accord and expanding energy cooperation across the Mediterranean. However, for Khalifa Haftar and his entourage, the same rapprochement is less about structural reform than about tactical leverage. By entertaining the prospect of ratifying the maritime MoU, Haftar hopes to secure policy adjustments from Ankara while simultaneously pressuring the EU through the weaponization of migration flows from eastern Libya. This duality should not surprise anyone, as transactional bargaining is a common approach in foreign policy, where concessions are traded across issues to achieve goals.
In any case, the evolving Turkey-Libya partnership anchored by the 2019 maritime agreement offers a rare opportunity for regional cooperation and economic growth. Yet, lasting stability in Libya hinges on inclusive dialogue, institutional rebuilding, and unified international support to transform diplomatic gains into enduring peace.
[1] https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/mit-baskani-kalindan-libya-ziyareti-halife-hafter-ile-gorustu,8S9efR4pykKmJIm7XA-SJA
[2] https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/turkiye-italya-ve-libya-isbirligi-zirvesi-istanbulda-gerceklestirildi/3648316
[3] https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/policy-outlooks/turkeys-strategy-in-libya-rationale-and-challenges/
[4] https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkiye-welcomes-eastern-libyas-review-of-maritime-deal-210216
[5] https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/enerjiterminali/petrol/tpao-libyada-sismik-arastirma-yapacak/50144
[6] https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-libya-temsilciler-meclisi-baskani-salihi-kabul-etti/2651731
[7] https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-libya-temsilciler-meclisi-baskani-salihi-kabul-etti/3081422
[8] https://www.newarab.com/opinion/understand-libya-stop-ignoring-its-complexities
[9] https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2023/07/turkiye-libya-relations-a-post-election-assessment?lang=en
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.
