Afghanistan: Inside and Outside the Web of News

Honestly, when we first went to Afghanistan, our minds were heavily influenced by what we had previously heard. We couldn’t expect a government that had come to power just two and a half years ago in a country that hadn’t seen the light of day for half a century to have solved everything in such a short time. Yet, no one really approaches the Taliban with understanding, nor does anyone particularly care to. People are perfectly content consuming the news presented to them exactly as it is, shaped by their own tastes and expectations.

Yet a movement that ended a 20-year-long U.S. occupation and, in just two and a half years, addressed both the drug problem and social peace in a way that is hard to believe, always deserves attention and interest. That’s why, when we first went one and a half years ago, there was an Afghanistan “in the web of news,” to use the phrase from Edward Said’s book title. What lay behind this web? What was the Taliban that drove people to cling to the wings and wheels of U.S. planes in sheer panic, and what did its arrival mean? Why were people fleeing in desperation? And when the Taliban took power, why was their first act to declare a general amnesty, and how did they manage to implement it?

We went to see the reality for ourselves. We reported what we saw, which was very different from what we had heard. Simply highlighting that difference was enough to astonish people. Yet there is a universal truth: some people are always more inclined to believe what they hear. If fish had a stronger grasp of reality, would they fall for nets or hooks?

On our second trip, we recorded developments that not only reinforced our previous impressions but even confirmed the continuity of the current situation. Reporting what we saw, of course, cannot be completely separated from the way we saw it. It is true that we had a different way of seeing things. Seeing everything from its worst angle is also a way of presenting it differently. Everything in Afghanistan was already as bad as it could be: there was occupation, drugs, high living costs, unemployment, low quality of life, and mass migration pressures on the Afghan people. In all these areas, there are now developments prompting the return of migrants. We are documenting the improvements that have come with the Taliban’s second coming. Is everything perfect, then? Was there nothing negative? Surely not.

What we have shared so far has focused on common negative prejudices about Afghanistan and the Taliban, which in reality were far from the truth. Saying this does not mean that a perfect system has been established in Afghanistan or that everyone is completely happy and satisfied.

Some of the existing problems are, of course, related to Afghanistan’s sociological, cultural, and historical conditions, not to the current Taliban administration. For example, there is no obligation to wear the burqa or veil in Kabul, at least. Women walking alone with their hair partially covered or uncovered and their faces visible, or men without beards, can be seen everywhere, and no one interferes. The requirement to wear a burqa is applied in some provincial towns, but even that is more a traditional practice than something introduced by the Taliban. On many issues related to women’s rights, the Taliban actually provides strong guarantees within Islamic frameworks, countering certain tribal traditions. It’s a long topic, and I have illustrated it with many examples in previous writings. For instance, a woman who would traditionally be forced to marry her brother-in-law after her husband’s death could appeal to a court run by a Taliban member, and the court ruled that even if tradition dictated otherwise, no woman could be married against her will. There are many such examples.

In all these matters, we tried to convey the truth contrary to prejudices, while also noting that the Taliban government faces very serious problems and that significant reforms are needed. We also attempted to express this with the attention and respect due to a society that had fought honorably and heroically against occupiers. For example, we noted that there is still significant inexperience in state administration and bureaucratic processes. Based on the principle in religion that God, His Book, the Prophet, the senior Muslims, and the ummah guide with sincerity and counsel (Bukhari and Muslim hadith), we expressed our advice on several occasions. Let us now summarize some of our observations in a more structured way:

First: The instability of the systems and laws regulating investment and economic activity, and the reliance on personal connections with those responsible for economic decision-making. This can lead to injustice and hinder society’s investment and participation opportunities by preventing transparent and trustworthy processes.

Second: Now, four years after the fall of tyrants and their masters, it is time to develop the necessary development plans, announce them publicly, and open the door to participation for anyone willing to engage. This should not be limited to amateurs or opportunists, but should instead be implemented through institutionalization and good governance, particularly in the economic sphere, which is the focus of society’s awakening, and in all other areas.

Third: Measures may be needed to ensure that the impressive examples of avoiding waste that we observed among state institutions and their managers do not remain a temporary behavior unique to the early years of the revolution. The use of power can gradually change people’s habits. Poverty among the populace can create resentment toward elites and drive society into another unnecessary cycle, neither now nor in the future.

Fourth: Since scholars have agreed not to impose taxes or penalties (although this could be reassessed according to different jurisprudential interpretations), establishing social solidarity funds at neighborhood, city, and provincial levels under the supervision of trusted mujahideen could serve the community and alleviate the poverty and suffering of Afghans.

Fifth: It is necessary to accelerate the enactment of new laws governing the state and society’s movement toward clear institutionalization, as many needed regulations are still progressing very slowly.

Sixth: Finally, for the Afghan experience to serve as a model for all Muslims, it is crucial to conduct the necessary consultations and establish sincere and respectful consultation mechanisms with the Muslim world, particularly Turkey and Islamic scholars.